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Preventing capture, and ensuring that the media can perform their 
societal function, requires an understanding of the myriad and 
sometimes subtle ways the media can be compromised by the 
very actors they are supposed to monitor. To that end, this chapter 
proposes four somewhat overlapping forms of capture–(a) ownership, 
(b) financial incentives, (c) censorship, and (d) cognitive capture–
arguing that a broader view of what constitutes capture usefully 
highlights less obvious but equally insidious threats to journalistic 
independence. 
This essay is a chapter from Anya Schiffrin, ed., In the Service of Power: Media Capture and
the Threat to Democracy (Washington, DC: Center for International Media Assistance, 2017)
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Introduction
There is a long literature describing the role of the media in our society—in par-
ticular, the role in preventing a broad range of abuses by government and the 
corporate sector. Indeed, the media play a critical role in our society’s systems of 
checks and balances in part by attempting to “regulate” behavior by watching to 
see whether government, business and other organizations are engaging in actions 
that are consonant with societal beliefs.
The media have limited power to correct detected abuses. Rather, their power is 
based on the premise that information itself will lead to a resolution; and the knowl-
edge that such information might be provided, will itself, lead to fewer abuses. As 
the expression goes, “sunshine is the strongest disinfectant.” Recently, the press has 
brought many abuses to light, including the 2014 Lux Leaks series on tax avoid-
ance as well as the 2016 Panama Papers on offshore banking, both of which were 
published by the International Consortium of International journalists. 
In order for the press to play a watchdog role, it must be independent, particularly 
of those on whom it is supposed to be reporting. If the media are captured, in one 
way or another, by the same organizations or people that they are supposed to 
report on and monitor, then the news will, at the very least, not be complete; in 
many cases, it will be distorted.  To prevent capture and allow the media to perform 
their societal role, we must understand the mechanisms by which it occurs. This 
chapter classifies and explores the ways in which the media get captured through 
ownership, financial incentives, censorship, and cognitive capture, and the subse-
quent consequences.
As mentioned in Anya Schiffrin’s introduction, “capture” is an economics term that 
describes what happens when regulators become overly empathetic or support-
ive of those they are meant to be regulating. Associated with economist George 
Stigler’s seminal “The Theory of Economic Regulation” (1971),1 the term was used 
widely after the financial crisis of 2008 to describe, for instance, how financial reg-
ulators failed to properly regulate the very banks and financial institutions that 
caused the crisis. By analogy, media capture occurs when one or more of the par-
ties that the media are supposed to be monitoring on behalf of society “captures” or 
takes hostage the media, so that they fail to perform their societal function.  
The most obvious example arises when a newspaper is owned by a particular 
business. Obviously, it will not then be in the interests of the newspaper to reveal 
the misdeeds of that business. Or a media outlet with an owner that has business 
interests may oppose a political candidate who supports policies that are viewed 
as against the interests of the media-affiliated business, despite his or her other 
qualifications. Similarly, business interests will push the newspaper to editorialize 
in favor of bills supporting the industry, and castigate those that might adversely 
affect the industry. Ideally, a newspaper will declare its interests so readers may 
judge for themselves, and perhaps discount the value of the newspaper’s views in 
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areas where there is a conflict. But many readers will not know of such conflicts, 
even if they are disclosed; and sometimes, perhaps often, they are not disclosed.  
Many early uses of the term “capture” focused on economic incentives—the regula-
tors often would return to jobs in the sector that they had regulated; the revolving 
door provided them an incentive to treat those they were regulating well. But over 
time, economists and political scientists have explored a broader range of mecha-
nisms by which capture occurs. One of the most important is cognitive capture, the 
notion that regulators may come to think like those they regulate, simply by the 
process of continual association and engagement. The revolving door may even 
have an impact on those government officials who studiously try not to be influ-
enced by economic prospects. Those government officials who spent years work-
ing in banks begin to think like bankers. There is a growing literature in behavioral 
economics emphasizing the endogeneity of beliefs, perceptions, and behaviors: 
we are social beings, and those with whom we associate affect us in a myriad of 
ways. Indeed, some of this research shows that simply reminding those who have 
worked in banks about their past identity as a banker leads them to behave in more 
selfish ways (Cohn et al. 2014). 
This chapter, like the earlier literature on regulatory capture, focuses on the eco-
nomics of capture, although we touch on cognitive capture. It does not give suffi-
cient weight to the impact of capture on political processes and the larger effects 
on social welfare.2 The experience of media practitioners along with the analytical 
understanding of media and communications scholars, political scientists, and 
sociologists, later chapters of this volume adds subtlety and detail to the study of 
media capture. 
This chapter explores and categorizes the ways in which the media are captured 
and the consequences. We focus in particular on how they are captured by corpo-
rate interests and governments, but the papers in this volume show that capture 
is a more general problem: media can even be captured, for instance, by philan-
thropic organizations, who simply want to advance their causes.  
We divide our analysis of capture into four broad, and somewhat overlapping, 
sections: (a) ownership, (b) financial incentives, (c) censorship, and (d) cognitive 
capture.  
Capture by ownership
Ownership is the one way in which media capture differs from standard regulatory 
capture. One cannot directly and openly buy a regulator (though critics of the US 
system of money in politics suggest that what happens in American politics is 
not much different from an open purchase). But wealthy individuals and corpo-
rations can and do buy media. They do so not just as a business proposition, but 
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sometimes out of a sense of public spirit—or at least to advance their political 
philosophies. Many purchase newspapers because of the possibility that the media 
give them to influence thinking, perceptions of events, and therefore politics itself. 
In doing so, these media owners almost inevitably have particular perspectives; 
and the perspectives of the rich typically differ from that of the rest of society. They 
are more likely to be conservative, against regulations and in favor of low taxes, 
and they are likely to support political candidates and parties that advance their 
interests. One might think that readers expect that—and therefore discount at least 
the editorials. Good newspapers have made an effort to separate editorial positions 
from news coverage, but arguably, in recent years, the separation has been eroding. 
Many believe that this is, for instance, a particularly marked feature of many of 
Rupert Murdoch’s holdings.  
Of course, in a “rational” market, news from media sources that have broken down 
the barrier between advertising and editorial will be less influential, simply because 
their reporting is less “credible.” If that were the case, newspapers would have an 
incentive to be neutral in their reporting (Knight and Chiang 2011).
As Schiffrin and Rasmus Kleis Nielsen note elsewhere in this volume, the rise of 
the Internet increased hopes that lower barriers to entry would democratize the 
media market so that media ownership would no longer be dominated by the 
wealthy and powerful. Entry from those of limited means has, in fact, increased, 
but the bigger question is whether the development of the Internet provided the 
hoped-for check on media capture. There are several reasons for concern that 
media may become less able to perform their critical roles.  
The first set of problems arises from the fact that in this new, digital era, stan-
dard media have become less profitable. This means they have become more of a 
“toy” for the super-rich.  Moreover, the new business models of the digital era do 
not support the kind of investigative journalism required for the media to play 
their watchdog role.  Most outlets do not have the resources to finance such deep 
investigations. And the benefits of “breaking” a story may be less, when minutes 
after breaking a story, it is available on the Internet through multiple other portals. 
Others effectively “free ride” on the original investigative reporting. As media out-
lets struggle for financing, the burden of paying for investigations has shifted else-
where, e.g. to foundations and philanthropies with an “agenda.”  But, in the absence 
of investigative journalism, there is less of a check against capture. 
Another important change is the rise of the much-maligned echo chamber in 
which people see only news that reinforces their preexisting beliefs. As a result, 
there is now less opportunity for the media to influence the unpersuaded; but per-
haps more of an opportunity to be a cheerleader for the persuaded. In the “old” 
model, the press was rewarded for being balanced. Trust in the media was based 
in part on the fact that the reporting was not biased. By demonstrating that it was 
not biased—that it was a credible news source—a media outlet could expand its 
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readership. In the “new” model, what matters is commitment:  media outlets have 
abandoned the hope of attracting those who see the world through a different 
lens. One expands readership or viewership by demonstrating that one’s views are 
consonant with that particular segment of the market at which one aims. This 
enhances trust within that segment, but weakens trust on the part of others. The 
net result is a diminution in trust in the press in general: there is a view that the 
others have been “captured.”  
A particularly insidious situation arises (an example of this can be found in Greece) 
where there is an unsavory link between oligarchs, the banking sector, the media, 
and politics: oligarchs used their economic and political influence to get loans to 
buy media, loans which otherwise would not pass muster, and then use their con-
trol of the media to influence the political process—circumscribing attempts to 
control their economic and political power (Papathanassopoulos 2013). 
The media are not just supposed to provide a check against corporate abuses, but 
also against government abuses, and Greece illustrates how that may fail—and 
may especially fail when there is a nexus between politics and corporate power, as 
there is in many countries, arguably including the United States.  
Another instance, of quite different form, where media capture resulted in the 
media not being able to fulfill the watchdog role vis-à-vis the government was in 
Italy, where during Silvio Berlusconi’s administration he owned three of the seven 
media stations, and government controlled another three. As a result, the checks 
against abuses of government ownership were weaker than in the United Kingdom 
and Italy was downgraded in the Freedom House ranking in Press Freedom.  
There is, of course, a distinction between government ownership and government 
“capture.” The BBC and other public broadcasters are an example of successful 
government ownership in that programming is balanced, objective, and represen-
tative of diverse viewpoints. 
Capture through financial incentives
The media face a variety of incentives, which are amply discussed elsewhere (see 
for example Besley and Prat’s “Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture 
and Government Accountability” (2006), which discusses the incentives of adver-
tising and access and how these incentives can result in the media becoming de 
facto captured). Even when media owners have non-economic objectives, they 
are concerned about profits (or losses), and hence worry about both advertisers 
and subscribers. The financial press thus becomes captured by the financial sector 
partly because it might lose both subscribers and advertisers were it not to reflect 
the viewpoints of that sector.  
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Similarly, both reporters and the owners of media may act as if they are captured 
by those they are supposed to be covering because they are aware that adverse sto-
ries may lead to a denial of access to information, leaving them at a disadvantage 
relative to competitors (Gans 1979; Starkman 2010). 
Censorship and capture
Governments lacking freedom of the press do not have to own the press to make 
sure that the press reflects their views—i.e., is “captured.”  They can simply cen-
sor what is written. While using the word “capture” to describe government-media 
relationships in such a world adds no insights and provides no new perspectives on 
what is going on—indeed, it seems to soften what is a hard relationship—self-cen-
sorship is practiced in many parts of the world, and not just toward governments, 
but also toward corporates. Concern about losing advertising revenues (whether 
from the government or the private sector) or subscribers, as well as access to vital 
news that is necessary if they are to remain competitive, induces media organiza-
tions to pull their punches, to soften what they might say, and not to undertake 
some investigations that they might otherwise have.  
Cognitive capture
In many ways, cognitive capture is the most interesting aspect of capture—the 
most subtle, the hardest to prove. It relates to how reporters perceive the world, and 
therefore how they write about it. One of the reasons that the subject is so import-
ant is that cognitive capture by media can lead to cognitive capture by society. The 
media help shape the views of the members of society, and if the media are cap-
tured, their reporting can give rise to the acceptance of views within society that 
reflect those interests. Rather than being the “fourth estate,” set apart from the rest 
of society to provide the checks and balances necessary to make society function 
well, the media are embedded within society, and are little more than a reflection 
of the views widely shared within it. Indeed, they can become part of the echo 
chamber that amplifies and solidifies conventional wisdom.  
Coverage of the events leading up to the 2008 financial crisis in Schiffrin (2011) 
(also discussed in Starkman 2014; Fraser 2009; Usher 2012) clearly illustrates these 
points. Maria Bartiromo may have achieved the status of chief cheerleader, but 
more remarkable was the dearth of those in the press who called attention to the 
rampant fraud, predatory lending, and other abusive practices of the financial sec-
tor. Floyd Norris, Gretchen Morgenson, Peter Goodman, and Mike Hudson stand 
out as among the few US reporters who questioned what really was going on. 
If this form of cognitive capture is to be prevented (or at least, the extent of it 
lessened), which it must be if the media are to perform their societal role, then we 
must understand the mechanisms by which it occurs. The chapters in this book 
provide much insight into the process.
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Some of this is almost obvious. Business and finance reporters talk to those in 
the business and finance sector, and to other business and finance reporters. If 
a strongly held conventional wisdom develops (when and how that happens is 
a matter of interest in its own right), then it is hard for any individual to stand 
against this weight of opinion, against the seeming collective wisdom. Few, if any, 
individuals have the capacity to weigh all the evidence relevant to any particular 
issue; we have to rely on others.3
It is precisely in such circumstances that there is the need for an independent 
press and its voice of skepticism, or at least agnosticism.  But individuals are social 
beings, and they don’t like to be the odd person left out. Moreover, there may be 
perverse incentives at play: a reporter who goes along with the crowd will hardly 
be chastised—who can blame him for not calling attention to the fact that there 
was a bubble, when even first rate economists failed to see it. But if it turns out 
that there is no bubble, and the reporter has been a naysayer, his judgment and 
reputation will come to be questioned. He may be viewed as an eccentric not to be 
trusted. Those with a good story to tell may be reluctant to turn to him to tell it.4
More generally, each individual’s beliefs and perceptions are affected by those with 
whom he or she associates. Financial reporters associate with those in the financial 
sector—so it should hardly be surprising that the reporters often come to adopt 
their beliefs and perceptions. Perhaps as a guard against this, media should rotate 
beats; the problem is that in certain areas—finance being among them—there is 
a large body of expertise required for effective coverage. Such rotations go against 
the need for and benefits of specialization. Only someone extraordinarily well-
versed in markets might know where to look to see the fraud that the banks hid so 
well. Apple’s public relations staff does a first-rate job explaining why the EU ruling 
on their tax abuses was wrong; only someone extraordinarily well-versed in inter-
national taxation might discover the holes in their arguments (or at least discover 
them fast enough to be of relevance to the daily news cycle).
Cognitive capture is impossible to fully prevent. And yet because it is the subtlest 
form of capture, it is the most corrosive: in principle, readers can guard themselves 
against some of the more blatant forms of capture, such as that associated with 
ownership. They take what is written on the editorial page with a grain of salt. But 
cognitive capture is pervasive and often unintended. And yet, as the 2008 crisis 
amply demonstrates, cognitive capture undermines the ability of the media to ful-
fill their societal mission just as much as do the other forms of capture described 
in this book.  
Concluding comments
The fourth estate is a critical part of the set of checks and balances within our soci-
ety. When the media get captured by those they are supposed to oversee—whether 
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government, corporations, or other institutions in our society—they cannot or will 
not perform their critical societal role.  
This paper has explored the various mechanisms by which capture occurs. Capture 
occurs in not just the obvious ones, such as through ownership, but in more subtle 
ways, most importantly through what we have referred to as cognitive capture. 
There was a hope, at one time, that changes in our economy, in particular the 
development of the Internet, would lead to a press that was less captured and bet-
ter able to fulfill its roles.  We have explained why that has not been the case:  quite 
the contrary. 
A straightforward reading of this paper is depressing: the most insidious form of 
capture, cognitive capture, is particularly hard to combat. But there is a note of 
optimism—simply the awareness of its presence allows us to see reporting through 
a different lens, and perhaps to correct the distortions it brings with it. And even 
more importantly, as the media become aware of the pervasiveness of cognitive 
capture and its implications for unbiased reporting, they can set in place checks 
and balances to mitigate the consequences.  
At the very least, a better understanding of the mechanisms of capture is necessary 
if we are to try to limit the extent of capture—if we are to create media that better 
fulfill their societal roles.  
ENDNOTES
1 Though the concept, and perhaps even the term, may have been used in earlier literature, 
e.g., in political science.
2 Though we note some important exceptions to this below.
3 Belief in global warming illustrates that few people who are not physicists or climate 
scientists have the capacity to weigh the evidence, the overwhelming evidence that it is 
occurring, with the limited evidence that might weigh in on the other side.  
4 Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) have described the perverse incentives giving rise to “herding” 
behavior.
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